Marquette Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 4 June 1928

Article 12

Insurance: Proceeds of Life Policy Payable to
Partnership Held Not Exempt from Insured Debt's,
Although Insured Became Partnership Successor
Al H. Hurley

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Al H. Hurley, Insurance: Proceeds of Life Policy Payable to Partnership Held Not Exempt from Insured Debt's, Although Insured Became
Partnership Successor, 12 Marq. L. Rev. 327 (1928).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol12/iss4/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENT

The judgment lien, so obtained against the partnership, was held by the
Supreme Court of the United States not to be annulled as against
partners, under the Bankruptcy Act, 67c, 67f (ii USCA par 107), since
it is not essential to the adjudication of a partnership that a partner,
or partners, should be adjudged bankrupt individually.
The Supreme Court, in this decision, reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, which decided that the "adjudication of the partnership was necessarily an adjudication of the bankruptcy of the individuals composing it," and that the lien of a judgment obtained within
four months of filing of petition against the partnership was lost
by the adjudication. The Court of Appeals seems to have followed
the Old Bankruptcy Law of 1867, which did not permit the partnership entity to be adjudged a bankrupt, and which declared that when
two or more persons who were partners in trade were adjudged bankrupt, the property of the partnership as well as the partner should be
taken over by the Bankruptcy Court for administration.
In Section 5a (ii

USCA par. 23)

the Supreme Court of the

United States sees a basis, in 268 U.S. 426, 431, 45 S. Ct. 56o, 562
(69 L. Ed. 1028), for the following conclusion, namely, that there
"can be no doubt that a partnership may be adjudged a bankrupt as
a distinct legal entity; and if proceeded against as a distinct legal
entity, without reference to the individual partnerships, it may, as such,
under section 12a (i USCA par. 30) offer terms of composition to
the partnership creditors alone. The court then cites a long line of
cases in support of this principle.
Hence the court concludes, in reversing the decision of the Court
of Appeals, "that the involuntary petition filed against the Provision
Co., which did not in terms seek an adjudication that the Beckers
(the individual partners) as individuals, nor allege that as individuals
they were insolvent or had committed any acts of bankruptcy, was
not in legal effect a petition filed against them individually, and the
adjudication under that petition that the partnership was a bankrupt,
was not in legal effect an adjudication that they were bankrupts individually." There is hence no ground, under either section 67c or section 67 f of the Act, for annulling the judgment liens obtained upon
their individual real estate more than eight months prior to the filing
of their voluntary petitions.
Reversed.
RAYmoND FoRD

Insurance: Proceeds of Life Policy Payable to Partnership Held
Not Exempt from Insured Debt's, Although Insured Became Partnership Successor.
This case involved a controversy over the avails of a life insurance
policy.' The material facts of the case are as follows: Cohen and
one Kirsner formed a partnership for the purpose of engaging in the
mercantile business. The partnership was later dissolved, Kirsner
ceasing to be a member. Cohen assumed all the firm liabilities and
remained in business as the successor of Cohen and Kirsner. The
creditors were informed of this arrangement. While the partnership
'Cohen v. Gordon Ferguson, Inc. (N.D.)

218 N.W. 209.
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was still in existence, Cohen obtained an ordinary life insurance policy.
By the terms of the policy the insurance company agreed to pay to
"Cohen and Kirsner, a partnership of which the insured is a member,
its successors or assigns, immediately upon the receipt of due proof
of the death of Charles W. Cohen, the insured, $2,500"; and "if such
death is accidental, $5,ooo." After the dissolution of the partnership
no changes were made in the policy, and Cohen himself continued
to pay the premiums.
Subsequently Cohen was killed in an accident. The question then
arose whether the avails of this policy belonged, and should be distributed, to the heirs at law of Charles W. Cohen in accordance with
the statute, 2 or whether they belonged to the estate of Cohen and were
subject to the claims of creditors and distributable the same as other
assets belonging to the estate of the deceased.
The ,appellants were of the contention that inasmuch as Charles
W. Cohen became the successor of the firm of Cohen nd Kirsner, the
policy became in fact, although not in terms, payable to him; and that
upon his death, his personal representatives would be entitled to collect
the avails of the policy and that consequently, it falls within the statute,
section 8719.
However, the court was of the opinion that the question of whether
the distribution of the avails of an insurance policy is controlled by
the statute, is determinable by the terms of the policy itself, namely,
by the terms used to designate the beneficiaries therein. Nowhere in
this disputed section of the statutes can any terms be found which might
include policies made payable to the insured himself. Thus the contention of the appellants could not be sustained by the court. The
general rule is, that unless exempted by statute, the avails of a life
insurance policy, made payable to the insured himself, become at
his death a part of his estate, and assets in the hands of the administrator of his estate. 3 There is no such exemption to be found in
this statute, and had the lawmakers intended to include policies made
payable to the insured himself, they would undoubtedly have done so.
Former decisions of the court have upheld this section of the statute.
The court can neither add nor detract from its terms, but it must
regard it as being applicable only to the classes or kinds of policies
enumerated therein. 4
Thus section 8719 does not purport to apply to all insurance policies,
but only to those where the insured has, by the use of appropriate
terms in designation of beneficiaries, indicated an intention that the
policy shall be controlled by it. The section is applicable only to
policies where by their terms are "made payable to the personal rep'Section 8719 C.L. 1913. North Dakota. "The avails of a life insurance
policy or of a contract payable by any mutual aid or benevolent society, when
made payable to the personal representatives of a deceased, his heirs or estate
upon the death of a member of such society or of such insured shall not be
subject to the debts of the decedent except by special contract, but shall be
inventoried and distributed to the heirs or heirs at law of such decedent."
4 Cooley's Brief on Insurance. 3726.
4
Baznk v. Smith, 36 N.D. 225, 162 N.W. 302; Talcott v. Bailey, 54 N.D. 19,
208 N.W. 549.
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resentatives of a deceased, his heirs or estate." The policy in suit
was not so made; it being made payable to "Cohen and Kirsner, a
partnership, its successors or assigns."
Thus the only logical conclusion for the court to come to was that the
avails of the insurance policy were held by the administratrix as part
of the general assets of the estate of Charles W. Cohen, deceased,
subject to claims of creditors, and not distributable to his heirs at law.
AL H. HURLEY
Intoxicating Liquors: Searches and Seizures.
In the case of Fabri v. United States (24 Fed. (2d) 185), a prohibition agent searched the residence of Fabri under authority of a
search warrant, which he assumed to be valid, and seized and took
away quantities of various liquors. Upon his arrest Fabri appeared
and filed a verified petition, assailing the validity of the warrant,
praying that it be quashed and the evidence so obtained suppressed
and that the seized property be ordered returned to him at his home.
In the petition he alleges only that he was in possession, and not that
he was in the lawful possession of the property. Upon a hearing
the court below ordered the warrant quashed and the evidence suppressed, but denied the prayer for a return of the property. Defendant sued out a writ of error, which is directed to the part of the
order denying him a return of the seized property.
The court held that "where upon an unlawful search of a dwelling
house, government agents seize property, the possession of which may
or may not have been unlawful, the person from whose possession it is
wrongfully taken is prima facie entitled to its restoration, and that the
government can make successful resistance to an appropriate petition
for its return only by showing affirmatively, by proofs other than those
obtained as a result of the unlawful search, that the property was,
at the time of seizure, being used in the commission of crime."
Upon the, general question of the duty of the courts to order the
return of liquor wrongfully seized by government agents in the course
of an unlawful search, there is hopeless conflict in the federal courts.
In arriving at its conclusion this court said, "Possession of liquor
in a dwelling house may be lawful or unlawful, depending upon the
mode of acquisition or the intended use," and "Unless we resort to
the facts disclosed by the search there is no ground at all on which
to invoke the presumption of section 33 of the National Prohibition
Act (41 Stat. 317; U.S.C.A. No. 50.)."
EUGENE M. HAERTLE
Larceny, Bailment, Misappropriation of Funds by a Broker.
Section 343.17, Statutes, among other things provides that "Whoever being a bailee of any chattel, money or valuable security shall
fraudulently take or fraudulently convert the same to his own use or
to the use of any person other than the owner thereof .... shall be
guilty of larceny."
A bailment "is a delivery of goods in trust, upon an agreement expressed or implied, that the trust shall be duly exercised, and the
goods returned or delivered over when the purpose of the bailment

